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By David Hearne, Researcher, Centre for Brexit Studies. 
Prior to the Brexit referendum, British opinion on the EU was relatively 
fluid. Poll results indicate quite large swings in opinion even over 
shorter periods[1]. In 1975, the UK voted overwhelmingly to remain in 
the European Communities (principally the European Economic 
Community) and those institutions have fluctuated dramatically in 
popularity over the decades ever since (through renaming and 
reorganisation). In contrast, since the referendum took place, attitudes 
have hardened dramatically. 
Whilst there have always been those who cared passionately about 
the EU – either positively or, more normally, negatively – it was rather 
a long way down on the list of things that was important to most 
Britons. The EU was seen as a largely arcane question, with the state 
of the economy, the NHS, the police, schools and immigration. 
Indeed, it is deeply ironic that at the 2006 Conservative Party 
Conference, David Cameron explicitly stated, “While parents worried 
about childcare, getting the kids to school, balancing work and family 
life – we were banging on about Europe.”[2] He was right: the state of 
Britain’s relationship with the EU was a debate that a minority of 
political individuals obsessed about. Most of us had far more prosaic 
concerns. 
Times have changed. In fact, I would argue that the reason for this 
shift is quite fundamental. For a substantial number of Britons, one’s 
attitudes towards EU membership has become bound up in one’s 
identity. Just as one might identify oneself as simultaneously English 
and a Brummie (sometimes alongside other markers of identity – e.g. 
one’s religious upbringing), today one identifies also as a Leaver or a 
Remainer. This level of political tribalism is not something I have 
witnessed within my lifetime in the UK. 
Of course, I am not for one moment trying to suggest that for most of 
us these new and emerging identities are hugely important. Nor do I 
think that they have displaced existing identities for most. 
Nevertheless, for a substantial minority, they have become important 
facets of who we are and how we see ourselves. Indeed, I suggest 
that whilst Brexit has reinforced nationalism within the UK (English, 
Scottish and Irish), the more profound change has been on the 
Remain side. After all, those who voted Leave have not changed their 
identity in the decade prior to the referendum. 
In contrast, it is a deep irony that Brexit has achieved something that 
the most ardent of pro-Europeans never could: a sense of 
European national identity. The waving of EU flags on the streets of 
London during the various anti-Brexit protests that have taken place is 
indicative of this. This forming of a new European identity is being 
done in the crucible of Brexit. Some of the progenitors, naturally, are 
nationals of other EU member states who have chosen to make the 
UK their home (whether permanently or for a shorter period). 
Most, however, are British nationals who feel as though Brexit is 
depriving them of their rights as European citizens and, 
fundamentally, is denying part of who they are. The same process can 
be witnessed through the astonishingly successful petition to revoke 
Article 50. Whilst, no doubt, fear or expediency might play a role for a 
small minority of signatories, for most the questions are likely to be 
more fundamental. 
Think for a moment what the petition implies. It is vastly more 
profound than simply asking for a second referendum. It suggests that 
a substantial portion of the population see leaving the EU as so 
cataclysmic that they are willing to forego what has hitherto been 
considered a democratic pre-requisite to reversing the notification of 
intention to leave under the Article 50 process. This is quite 
fundamental: through the actions of its critics, the EU has succeeded 
in becoming a part of peoples’ identity. 
This is all the more remarkable because the past decade-and-a-half 
have seen a number of problematic reverses for the EU. Far from 
becoming more centralised, power has leeched away from the centre 
back to national capitals. The centre is unable to discipline its 
recalcitrant member Hungary, and there is a real risk that member 
states might choose to ignore requirements from Brussels that they 
don’t like. The Eurozone is a sore that continues to fester – largely 
due to an inability to countenance increased centralisation. The 
concern that German taxpayers might subsidise Italian ones suggests 
that the aforementioned taxpayers still see themselves primarily as 
German rather than European. The same cannot be said of some of 
those on the streets of London. 
For a technocratic institution that has faced a barrage of criticism 
(some warranted, some not) over the past decade this is a striking 
turnaround. Are we seeing the emergence of a nascent 
European demos in a subset of the British population? Is a new 
community being imagined?{Anderson, 1983 #160}[3] I don’t know 
and wouldn’t be prepared to speculate. All I can say, is that something 
truly remarkable is happening and that, as a result, the cleavage 
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